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Abstract
Three Essays on Urban and Health Economics
Hyunwoong Pyun
The dissertation covers two topics. The first in two essays explore the causal negative
effect of professional sporting events on a hosting city. The Last essay tries to estimate
the causal effect of smoking cessation on health outcome. In the first essay, I examine the
impact of Major League Baseball (MLB) games on crime in a host city using the Washington
Nationals case, which moved from Montreal, Canada to Washington DC in 2005, as a natural
experiment. To address endogeneity concerns, I apply a synthetic control method with using
21 large cities which host an MLB team as a “donor pool” and employs a triple difference-in-
difference approach to estimate the change in crime before and after the Nationals coming,
between MLB season and off-season, and Washington DC and the synthetic Washington.
With monthly crime data from the Uniform Crime Report, only assaults increased by 7 to
7.5% annually after the Nationals moved to DC; other crimes were unchanged. This result
is supported by statistical significance and in-space placebo tests, and several alternative
specifications in robustness check. Little to no evidence of a causal relationship between
MLB games and other types of crime. The second essay, jointly with Dr. Brad Humphreys,
looked at the relationship between MLB games and traffic congestion. No empirical evidence
currently exists linking sporting events to local traffic conditions. This chapter analyzes
urban mobility data from 25 US metropolitan areas with MLB teams over the period 1990
to 2014 to assess the relationship between local traffic and MLB games. Instrumental variable
regression results indicate MLB attendance causes increases in local vehicle-miles traveled.
At the sample average attendance of 2.8 million, average daily vehicle-miles traveled increases
by about 0.5% or 1.5% on a game day in cities with MLB teams. Traffic congestion increases
by 2%, suggesting that MLB games generate congestion externalities. The last essay explores
the causal effect of smoking cessation on health outcome. While negative impacts of smoking
on health are well-known, assessing the effect of smoking cessation on health is difficult due to
self-selection problems. I address this self-selection using propensity score matching. Using
a rich longitudinal data set from the British Household Panel Survey, this chapter finds 5 to
6 percentage point (8%) increases in the probability of an individual reporting good health
status among quitters compared to inconsistent smokers. Respiratory problems decline by
30% from the average. The estimated effect of quitting on health diminishes with the number
of cigarettes smoked before quitting and smoking tenure.
.
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1Chapter 1
Exploring Causal Relationship
between Major League Baseball
Games and Crime: A Synthetic
Control Analysis
1.1 Introduction
To attract a professional sports franchise into a city, or to keep an existing franchise,
public subsidization for new stadium/arena construction is common in the United States.
After 2000, 15 new Major League Baseball (MLB) stadiums were constructed, involving
an average of $ 520 million in public funding (National Sports Law Institute of Marquette
University Law School, 2013). In 2005, the Montreal Expos moved to Washington DC and
were renamed the Washington Nationals. As part of the move, the DC city government
subsidized most of the construction costs, $ 796.6 million, for a new baseball stadium for the
Nationals (The Washington Post, 2008).
To justify these subsidies, direct economic benefits would first be considered. Numerous
studies have assessed the tangible economic impact of new facilities and teams. Studies on
the effect of stadiums and franchises mostly find little to no increases in employment, per-
sonal income, or personal income per capita (Baade, 1996; Coates and Humphreys, 2002,
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2003a; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). Research on intangible benefits, such as civic pride,
followed. Papers on this topic mostly find positive estimates of willingness to pay for intan-
gible benefits, but not enough to cover most construction costs (Johnson et al., 2001; Owen,
2006; Groothuis et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2007).
Major sporting events are suspected to be associated with crime, and crime is an impor-
tant social cost, so it is necessary to assess the effect of a professional sports team or a new
stadium on crime for validating public subsidies for sports facilities. Studies on this topic
are relatively few, and contain mixed evidence on the relationship between sporting events
and crime.
This paper examines the extent to which professional baseball games cause more crime in
the local area. A natural experiment design is constructed using the Washington Nationals
move. By applying a triple difference-in-difference with a synthetic control method, and
using monthly data from Uniform Crime Report (UCR), this paper finds little evidence
supporting a causal relationship between MLB games and crime in DC, except for the case
of assaults. The move of the Nationals to Washington DC did not generally increase crime
in the area.
1.2 Context
Recent papers on the relationship between crime and sporting events reflect the concen-
tration of crime on game day in host cities. Rees and Schnepel (2009) report increases in
assault, vandalism, arrests for disorderly conduct, and arrests for alcohol-related offenses on
college football game days. Using similar data, Card and Dahl (2011) show that upset losses
in National Football League (NFL) games lead to 10% increases in incidents of domestic
violence; Kalist and Lee (2016) report that NFL home games are associated with increases
in total crime, and financially motivated crime. Using hourly data before and after soccer
matches, Munyo and Rossi (2013) report that frustration from match results increases vio-
lent crime in Uruguay. Marie (2016) finds increases in property crime on soccer match days
in London, England.
As regression-based estimates do not consider the case of absence of sporting events (or
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teams) in a local community, it is difficult to assess the causal relationship between crime
and sports events in the results discussed above. For example, findings in this literature
might only reflect the temporal concentration of crime on a game day. If a city does not
host any games (i.e. a city does not have a team), criminal activities might spread out on
non-game days, resulting in no actual change in crimes committed.
Some of studies above also show indirect effects of sporting events on crime. Emotional
triggers, based on reference-dependent preference models with loss averse agents, predict
that upset losses generate frustration in fans and make them commit more crimes (Rees
and Schnepel, 2009; Card and Dahl, 2011; Munyo and Rossi, 2013; Kalist and Lee, 2016).
Whether this theory supports a causal relationship between crime and games is unclear.
First, while frustration can cause more crime, like the theory above predicts, the assumption
that sporting events are the only source for emotional cues is limiting. If any other sources
of emotional triggers exist, the number of crimes occurring might not be different if a city
loses a sports team, or has no team. Second, most empirical tests of this theory show that
only upset losses increase crime; upset losses are systematically rare. Unexpected losses
require two conditions: 1) the home team must be better than the opponent, and 2) the
home team must lose when the probability of a loss is small. For example, Card and Dahl
(2011) analyze 993 NFL games, and only 79 upset losses (about 8%) exist in this sample.
This small number of upset losses represent about 1.2 games per season. Also, using the
estimated coefficient and average number of crimes in their data, NFL games are associated
with an increase in crime of 0.12 incidents of domestic violence per year. Although their
coefficients are statistically significant, it is questionable whether a local government should
consider this small increase in crime as a social cost.
Assessing the direct effect of home games on crime represents a better approach to un-
derstanding the crime-related social costs of sports. Yu et al. (2016) use the hot spot theory
of crime and report a positive effect of home basketball games on robberies; away games do
not affect crime. These changes in crime are associated with large crowds attending games
and can also be motivated by Becker (1968)’s theory of crime. Criminals might face lower
opportunity costs of committing crime on a game day, in terms of identifying victims or
escaping police detection by disappearing in the large crowds going to or from the arena.
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Alcohol consumption could be the another key factor explaining increases in crime, as al-
cohol consumption is associated with sporting events and is also often associated with the
commission of crime.
Other motivations for this paper come from studies which fail to find a statistical rela-
tionship between crime and sporting events. Billings and Depken II (2011) find no evidence
of a relationship between sporting events in Charlotte, NC and various types of crime1. Bau-
mann et al. (2012) use annual crime data, and find little to no evidence that sporting events
are associated with either property or violent crime, except during the Olympics Games and
the Super Bowl. One possible hypothesis for the finding of no relationship in Baumann et al.
(2012) is that the short NFL schedule, only 8 NFL home games are played each season,
would not affect annual crime data much. MLB teams usually play 10-15 home games in a
month, so changes in monthly crime rates during the MLB season would be easier to detect
than the effect of NFL games on annual crime data.
Most similar to this paper is Pyun and Hall (2016), who explore the causal relationship
between NFL games and crime using the Detroit Lions as a case study. They find little to no
evidence of increases in crime associated with NFL games in the Detroit area, except larceny,
but they only concentrate suburban cities in the Detroit MSA due to data limitations.
The identification strategy in this paper is an improvement on studies using annual data
(Baumann et al., 2012), but not perfect as the treatment effect applies only to home game
days using monthly frequency data. This identification has an advantage as it is possible that
some portion of game attendees commit crime before or after game day and these criminal
activities will be captured in here, while other studies with daily data cannot. Also, this
paper exploits a natural experiment, and tries to take account of the change in crime before
and after the Nationals move.2 The synthetic control method allows for the construction of
a suitable comparison group, which aids in the estimation of the relationship between crime
and MLB games.
1Billings and Depken II (2011) instead find a spatial concentration of crime on event days.
2Munyo and Rossi (2013) also exploit natural experiments but they only compare the change in crime
between game and non-game days.
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1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Sample and Data
After 2000, Washington, DC was the only US city to attract a MLB team to move into
the city. The Washington Nationals moved from Montreal, Canada to Washington, DC in
2005. Washington DC represents the treatment city. For a “Donor pool” to construct a
synthetic control group, cities with a population more than 300,000 are initially considered.
From this group of cities, I select cities with an MLB team for a donor pool for the synthetic
control group.3 Cities with a population more than 300,000 but without MLB teams were
considered as an another dimension of a donor pool, but disregarded./footnoteCities which
don’t have a MLB team but have at least one sports team were used in Robustness check
later. Cities without MLB teams have small populations, or isolated locations, and appear
to be quite different from the treatment city. Abadie et al. (2015) recommends restricting
the donor pool to be as similar to the case of interest as possible.
The sample period is from 2000 to 2009; this paper employs data 5 years before and after
the Nationals’ move. Offenses Known and Clearance by Arrest data from the Uniform Crime
Report (UCR)4 are analyzed. Monthly, city-level data are available for the entire sample
period. This paper estimates the effect of MLB games on the following types of crime: actual
number of total offenses, total assaults, total simple assaults, total larcenies, and total motor
vehicle theft per 100,000 population.
Miami and Tampa in Florida, Minneapolis, MN, New York, NY and Oakland, CA are
excluded from the donor pool as these cities did not provide complete monthly data to the
UCR. New Orleans, LA is also excluded from the donor pool because of missing values in
the data, mostly due to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. There is some variation in the donor
pool across each crime category. Chicago, IL was excluded from only the simple assault
regressions as Chicago did not provide the number of simple assaults to the UCR.
Demographic and economic variables from all sample cities are used to construct a syn-
3Cincinnati had population less than 300,000 in 2010, but an average population from 2000 to 2010
greater than 300,000.
4UCR data are available at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
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thetic Washington DC for a control group. Total population, percent of population age
18-24, percent of population age 65+, percent of population African American, percent of
population Hispanic, percentage of population college graduate or higher, unemployment
rate, and median household income are used as predictors of the crime outcome variables
of interest. These city level data are from the 2010 U.S. Census. Summary statistics for
Washington DC and the sample of donor cities are shown in Table 1.1.
1.3.2 Synthetic Control Method
Natural experiments or quasi-experimental studies are useful methods for exploring a
causal relationships in economics. However, due to the lack of random sampling and random
assignment of treatments, causal results using these methods are often challenged. The
synthetic control method is one way to address this problem. This method constructs a
synthetic control group from a weighted average of cities in a donor pool, and the synthetic
control group will closely resemble the treatment group. Formally, the synthetic control
method finds optimal weights for each donor city by minimizing
k∑
m=1
vm(X1m −X0mW )2 (1.1)
where X1m is a vector of predictor variables in a treatment group and X0m is a (kxj) matrix of
the mth predictor variable for units in the donor pool. vm indicates a weight that reflects the
relative importance estimated for the mth variable. The synthetic control method chooses
W ∗, a vector of weights for each unit in the donor pool, that minimizes Equation (1.1)
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). Note that every element in W ∗
is between zero to one and the sum of all elements is one. As discussed above, Washington
DC is the treatment city, and the 21 cities with population greater than 300,000 and an
MLB team constitute the donor pool. Total population, age 18-24 percentage, age over 65
percentage, Afro-American percentage, Hispanic percentage, percentage of college graduate
or higher, unemployment rate, and median income are used for predictor variables.
Usually, papers exploiting a natural experiment define a comparison group using units
that do not receive the treatment. In this case, the donor pool is constructed with data from
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units that do not experience some intervention and W ∗ is calculated using pre-intervention
data in the synthetic control method. However, to avoid possible problems of heterogeneity
among cities and Washington, this paper constructs a donor pool containing cities that
already have the treatment (i.e. host an MLB team). Therefore, when constructing a
synthetic control group, I use post-intervention data as both Washington and other cities
have MLB teams after the Nationals arrived in DC.
1.3.3 Triple Difference-in-Difference Model
After applying the synthetic control method, Bohn et al. (2014) and Munasib and Rick-
man (2015) construct difference-in-difference type estimators to estimate the average treat-
ment effect. This paper applies a triple difference-in-difference model, as the effect of MLB
games on crime would manifest differently in 3 dimensions: as before and after moving, Wash-
ington DC versus synthetic Washington DC, and in-season and off-season months. Even if
MLB games have a causal effect on crime, crime during the off-season will not change af-
ter the Nationals move to the city. By using monthly data, this paper can employ these
3 dimensions into a difference-in-difference model and look for more precise evidence of a
sport-crime relationship. The basic form of triple difference-in-difference model is
crimeit = β1 + β2treatit + β3postit + β4seasit+ β5treatit ∗ postit + β6treatit ∗ seasit
+ β7postit ∗ seasit + β8treatit ∗ postit ∗ seasit + uit (1.2)
where crimeit indicates the number of crimes per 100,000 committed in city i (either Wash-
ington DC or synthetic Washington) in month t. As mentioned above, models explaining
variation in the monthly number of total offenses, total assaults, total simple assaults, total
larcenies, and total motor vehicle thefts are estimated separately. treatit = 0 for synthetic
Washington and 1 for Washington DC, postit = 1 after the Nationals moved to Washington
DC. This paper sets April 2005 as the month the move occurred; this is when games were first
played in DC. seasit = 1 when the MLB season is ongoing. I assume that the MLB season
is from April to September. Games in March or October were very rare for the Washington
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Nationals in this period. In the 10 year sample period, the nationals only played 1 game in
March and 3 games in October, while actual games played in each month during the season
varied from 10 to 15. I ignore a few home games played in March and October./footnoteIn
robustness check, I take account these few games in March and October by using the number
of games and monthly attendance.
From Equation (1.2), βˆ8 captures changes in crimes committed during the MLB season
in Washington DC after the Nationals moved in compared to the synthetic Washington.
Therefore, a positive βˆ8 supports the existence of a causal relationship between MLB games
and crime.
1.3.4 Inference
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) express concern about
using traditional statistical inference methods in synthetic control analysis. This concern
stems mostly from small sample size problems. For example, Abadie et al. (2010) use only
40 periods (years) and one state as a treatment group. However, because of the availability
of monthly data, the sample period here is 120 months, so asymptotic properties of inference
methods should be applicable to the estimator of interest. Therefore, I report standard
statistical significance measures for estimates from Equation (1.2).
Though this paper has a relatively large sample period, the use of a single treatment
city might be problematic for statistical inference. Therefore, I use ‘in-space placebo’ tests
introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2015). In-space
placebos are a method that assigns every city in the donor pool pairwise to the treatment
city, constructs a synthetic control comparable with the treatment city, and estimates the
average treatment effect (β8 from Equation (1.2)). This idea is very similar to the standard
concept of statistical significance tests. The P-value for the significant test indicates the
probability that the estimator of interest comes from the null hypothesis (no relationship).
Here, after re-estimating all placebos, the distribution of the average treatment effects is
very similar concept to the distribution under the null hypothesis in a statistical significance
test. Therefore, by comparing βˆ8 to this distribution, a p-value can be constructed. This
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paper reports p-values from the distribution of the average treatment effect from in-place
placebo testing.
1.4 Results
Cities which have a positive weight in the synthetic control method are shown in Table
1.2. Predictor variables comparisons between Washington and synthetic Washington are
shown in Table 1.3.
Figure 1.1 shows the graphical analysis of the treatment effect of MLB games on crime.
Before analyzing this graph, note that these figures are different from figures presented
in other studies with the synthetic control method. As discussed above, I use cities that
already had a treatment effect (i.e. MLB teams) as a donor pool, so I match the treatment
city and a donor pool with post-intervention data, while other studies use pre-intervention
data. Therefore, the x-axis on Figure 1.1 shows a reverse order of time periods. Period 0
indicates the end of the period, December 2009 and period 120 shows the start of the period,
January 2000. The vertical dotted line shows the Nationals arrival, and the right (left) hand
side from the vertical line shows pre (post)-intervention period. A causal relationship is
supported if crime in synthetic Washington is greater than crime in Washington before the
Nationals arrived.
Fitting results in the post-intervention period do not look successful compared to the
previous studies with the synthetic control. As this paper uses monthly data, which is more
volatile than annual data, it is hard to see the trends and how well the synthetic control
group matches with the treatment group. I argue that the fitting results show enough
common trends to apply the difference-in-difference approach. Committed crime in the post-
intervention period in Washington DC look more volatile than the synthetic Washington,
but the trend, in terms of up and down, looks similar for both.
As I consider the difference between in-season and off-season outcomes, it is hard to
capture changes in 3 dimensions in a two-dimensional figure. However, for total assaults and
simple assaults, crime in Washington in the pre-intervention period is clearly smaller than
crime in synthetic Washington. Changes in total criminal offenses and motor vehicle thefts
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are questionable. For total criminal offenses, it seems that differences between cities remain
in the post-intervention period. For motor vehicle theft, crime in Washington is greater than
in synthetic Washington in some pre-intervention periods.
Results from the triple difference-in-difference model are shown in Table 1.4. All esti-
mated coefficients, except βˆ8, from Equation (1.2) capture changes in crime which are not
related to the Nationals moving to DC. For example, the negative estimated coefficient on
treat for all crime categories except motor vehicle thefts indicates Washington has seen a
relatively low number of these crime committed compared to synthetic Washington. The
estimated coefficient on the variable post for all crime categories is negative and significantly
different from zero, which indicates a decrease in crime after the Nationals move in both
Washington and synthetic Washington. The effect of weather on crime seems to be captured
by the estimated coefficient on seas. As the MLB season usually covers spring to fall, crim-
inal activities would be concentrated in the MLB season and the positive and statistically
significant coefficient for all crimes except motor vehicle theft capture this effect.
After taking account of these exogenous effects, the estimated coefficient on the triple
difference-in-difference variable (treat ∗ post ∗ seas) reflects the change in crime during the
MLB season in Washington DC compared to synthetic Washington after the Nationals moved
in. For all crime categories, estimated coefficients are positive but only the estimated coef-
ficient on total assaults and simple assaults are significant at the 5% level. At the mean of
the number of monthly crimes for each category in Washington DC, these coefficients can be
translated to a 14% monthly increase during the MLB season or 7% annual increase in total
assaults, and a 15% monthly increase during the MLB season, or a 7.5% annual increases in
simple assaults.5 In-space placebo tests also support the statistical significance of these two
coefficient estimates. The cumulative distribution of treatment effects is shown in Figure
1.2. Both coefficient estimates are the two largest among the estimated treatment effects
from the in-space placebo tests.
The treatment effect on total criminal offenses is only significant at the 10% level, and
supported by the in-space placebo test. The estimated effect indicates monthly 7% increases
5As the MLB season covers 6 months, I divide the estimated monthly increases by 2 to calculate the
annual changes.
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in the MLB season or yearly 3.5% increases in total offenses. For motor vehicle thefts,
estimated coefficient is only supported by the in-space placebo test and shows monthly 10%
and yearly 5% increases.
As this study concentrates on MLB game attendance related crime, and total criminal
offenses include many severe crimes such as homicide which are not likely related to sporting
events, little to no evidence for increases in total criminal offenses after the arrival of the
Nationals is intuitively understandable. For motor vehicle theft as well, mixed results are
plausible and might indicate that auto theft is associated with MLB games in a different
way.
Changes in the number of total larcenies associated with MLB games are not supported by
any analysis above. This result is a bit surprising as some types of larceny, such as pocket-
picking and purse-snatching, are plausibly associated with large game attendance. Also,
Pyun and Hall (2016) find a weak evidence for decreases in larceny after the Lions move out.
No changes in larceny might reflect some unique unobservable feature of Washington DC,
not the relationship between crime and MLB games. This limitation cannot be addressed in
a single city case study.
Overall, this paper finds evidence for a causal relationship between MLB games and
assaults, mixed, inconclusive evidence for a relationship between MLB and total criminal
offenses and motor vehicle theft, and no evidence for a relationship between MLB games and
larceny.
1.5 Robustness Check
In this section, several alternative models are estimated to test the robustness of the
main results. In the first two models, alternative average treatment effect (ATE) estimators
are used to see whether changes in crime is driven by baseball games or other unobservable
factors. Instead of using interactions among treat, post and seas in Equation (1.2), I use
the number of home games played in month t, and monthly home attendance. These vari-
ables have more variation than dummy variable (treat ∗ post ∗ seas in Equation (1.2)), and
ATE estimator will capture MLB game specific effect on crime while the original approach
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might contain some other variation which is not related to baseball but exists only during
MLB season after the Nationals’ move. If ATE from using the number of home games and
attendance looks similar to the original one, this concern will disappear.
Also, comparing the results from using the number of games and those from attendance
is meaningful. It is uncertain whether the estimated ATE from the original specification
comes from game attendance directly, or contains some externalities. If it is the former case,
two results will look similar. 6
In the third and fourth models, I use different set of cities as a donor pool to address
possible problems from other sports team. Washington DC also has football, basketball
and hockey team in the all sample period and these teams and games might affect crime as
well. This would not create big problem as baseball season is not overlapped with others
mostly, but variation in existence of other sports team between cities in a donor pool might
be problematic. To deal with this problem, I estimate the original model using a restricted
cities which have all 4 major sports team in a donor pool. To do so, cities in the donor
pool reduced to 5.7 Cities with two MLB teams are also excluded as two teams might have
different effect on crime.
In the last model, I use cities that have at least one sports team but don’t have MLB
team as a donor pool, to address problems which might arise with using cities with treatment
effect as a control group. As discussed earlier, I only use cities with baseball team to avoid
possible heterogeneity problems. However, heterogeneity among cities without MLB team
and Washington DC could be minimized if only cities having at least one sports team are
used. Therefore, I use 10 cities as a donor pool in this model.8 Note that I did not exploit
in-space placebo test for the third and fourth models as the number of cities in a donor pool
is too small to construct a test.
Table 1.5 shows only estimated ATE (β8 in Equation (1.2)) from the original specification
6Alternative explanation is possible. Game attendance can be interpreted as general interests on a game
in a city, so crime could be committed by people who didn’t attend the game but go to a bar or somewhere
to watch the game. So bigger attendance might lead more crime which is not related to game attendance.
However, as the Nationals’ performance was consistently low in all sample period, I argue that the general
interests stay same and estimated ATE would capture the direct effect of attendance on crime.
7This includes Atlanta, Boston, Denver, Detroit and Philadelphia.
8This includes Charlotte, Columbus, Indianapolis, Memphis, Nashville, Oklahoma city, Portland, Sacra-
mento, San Antonio, and San Jose.
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and models for robustness check. Model (1) replicates the original results from Table 1.4.
Model (2) and (3) use the number of monthly home games and monthly attendance for
estimating ATE. Model (4) uses cities with all 4 major sports teams as a donor pool and
Model (5) uses cities that don’t have MLB teams but have at least one sports team. The
results look similar to our main results mostly. For total assault, model (2) and (3) indicate
that additional MLB game increases total assault by 1.6, and additional 1,000 monthly
attendance increases total assault by 0.05. For simple assault, only model (4) supports the
significant effect of MLB games. Model (5) does not report any significant effects. 9
The main results are generally robust to these alternative specifications. Increased total
assaults are more likely to be caused by MLB games, and the restricted sample evidence also
supports weak to no evidence between MLB games and crime.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper explores the causal relationship between crime and sporting events. Using
the case of the Washington Nationals and monthly crime data from the UCR, this paper
exploits a natural experiment. From a triple difference-in-difference model and synthetic
control approach, this paper finds increases in only assaults by 14 to 15% monthly or 7 to
7.5% yearly, after the Nationals moved to DC. These increases in assaults are significant at
only the 10% level, but supported by in-place placebo tests and robustness check. Little
to no evidence is found supporting increases in total criminal offenses, larceny and motor
vehicle theft.
As the approach in this paper is a single city case study, it is hard to generalize the
results to all MLB cities. The results in this paper might reflect some unobservable factors
in Washington, DC. At the same time, by applying a synthetic control approach, this paper
corrects for unobservable heterogeneity among treatment and control groups as much as
possible.
It is hard to determine from the results in this paper whether a local government should
9Results from Model (5) only provides that weak evidence for assault from the original specification might
be also questionable, as other results look similar. This model is most problematic for heterogeneity at the
same time.
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consider the social cost of increases in crime from a sports franchise when considering a
subsidy for new facility construction. Only weak evidence is found for increases in assaults,
and it is hard to quantify the size of the social costs from this estimated increase in assaults.
While positive, the size of the social costs are difficult to determine.
Additional future research on this topic can be expected, as the existing evidence on the
relationship between sport and crime from natural experiments and a regression analysis
using high frequency data are conflicting. Quantifying the actual social costs from increased
crime attributable to sporting events is also needed. Results from studies on this topic will
be very useful for urban policy makers who are interested in attracting a sports team to their
region.
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Figure 1.1: Changes in Crime: Washington and Synthetic Washington, by Crime Category
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Figure 1.2: Cumulative Distribution of Average Treatment Effects, by Crime Category
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Table 1.1: General Characteristics of Sample Cities
Population Age 18-24 Age over Black Hispanic College grad Unemploy- Median
% 65 % % % or higher% ment rate income
Washington DC 601,723 14.0 11.5 50.7 9.1 49.2 9.4 58,526
Phoenix 1,445,632 10.3 8.0 6.5 40.8 25.5 7.4 48,823
Los Angeles 3,792,621 11.1 10.2 9.6 48.5 30.2 9.1 49,138
Anaheim 336,265 10.3 9.1 2.8 52.8 23.1 9.6 57,807
San Diego 1,307,402 13.2 10.6 6.7 28.8 40.8 7.3 62,480
San Francisco 805,235 9.4 13.7 6.1 15.1 51.2 7.6 78,378
Denver 600,158 10.3 10.5 10.2 31.8 40.1 7.8 45,501
Atlanta 420,003 14.3 9.7 54.0 5.2 45.0 9.9 45,171
Chicago 2,695,598 11.0 10.3 32.9 28.9 34.9 11.1 46,877
Boston 617,594 19.0 10.0 24.4 17.5 42.5 9.3 50,684
Baltimore 620,961 12.3 11.7 63.7 4.2 25.2 11.5 39,386
Detroit 713,777 10.3 11.0 82.7 6.8 11.8 24.8 28,357
Kansas City 459,787 9.5 11.2 29.9 10.0 29.6 9.2 44,113
St. Louis 319,294 11.8 11.4 49.2 3.5 26.9 12.7 33,652
Cincinnati 296,943 13.9 11.1 44.8 2.8 30.8 10.7 33,681
Cleveland 396,815 10.0 12.5 55.2 10.0 13.1 17.8 27,349
Philadelphia 1,526,006 12.7 12.4 43.4 12.3 22.2 12.6 36,251
Pittsburgh 305,704 17.3 14.6 26.1 2.3 33.8 8.6 36,019
Arlington 365,438 11.1 7.6 18.8 27.4 28.9 8.1 52,094
Houston 2,099,451 10.8 9.0 23.7 43.8 28.2 8.0 42,962
Seattle 608,660 11.8 10.9 7.9 6.6 55.1 6.3 60,665
Milwaukee 594,833 13.1 9.1 40.0 17.3 21.0 11.6 35,921
Washington DC is the treatment city, others constitute the donor pool.
Data are from the 2010 U.S. Census.
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Table 1.2: Estimated Weight from Synthetic Control, by Crime Category
Total Total Simple Total Motor vehicle
offense assault assault larceny theft
Anaheim 0 0 0.05 0 0
San Francisco 0.317 0.135 0 0.144 0.367
Atlanta 0.238 0.244 0.10 0.05 0439
Boston 0.269 0.164 0.078 0.256 0.132
Baltimore 0.176 0.325 0.613 0.549 0.103
Detroit 0 0 0 0 0.056
Pittsburgh 0 0.107 0.121 0 0
Houston 0 0.025 0.037 0 0
Seattle 0 0 0 0 0.138
Cities that receive positive weight at least once are shown.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Washington and Synthetic Washington
Population Age 18-24 Age over Black Hispanic College grad Unemploy- Median
% 65 % % % or higher% ment rate income
Washington DC 601,723 14.0 11.5 50.7 9.1 49.2 9.4 58,526
Synthetic Washington
Total offense 630,642.1 13.66 11.40 32.56 11.47 42.81 9.29 56,162.46
Total assault 599,481.8 13.99 11.44 42.08 8.88 37.37 9.82 47,643.46
Simple assault 602,304.8 13.45 11.47 50.52 8.99 29.55 10.58 43,703.13
Total larceny 635,965.6 13.68 11.44 44.79 9.22 34.33 10.28 41,452.31
Motor vehicle theft 603,869.2 11.93 11.40 31.66 9.11 46.81 9.39 58,554.56
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Table 1.4: Triple Difference-in-Difference Result
Dependent Total Total Simple Total Motor vehicle
variable offense assault assault larceny theft
constant 733.25*** 213.57*** 155.79*** 290.63*** 117.24***
(13.304) (4.580) (3.553) (7.109) (3.334)
treat -52.767*** -44.861*** -47.478*** -25.065** 2.399
(18.814) (6.477) ( 5.024) (10.054) (4.715)
post -127.81*** -46.494*** -36.969*** -60.252*** -26.157
(19.832) (6.827) ( 5.296) (10.597) (4.969)
seas 71.999*** 38.844*** 22.134*** 32.592*** 3.390
(19.279) (6.637) (5.148) (10.301) (4.831)
treat ∗ post 33.414 41.493*** 44.714*** 20.160 -7.06
(28.047) (9.655) (7.490) (14.987) (7.028)
treat ∗ seas -22.677 -17.996* -13.748* -7.764 -1.356
(27.265) (9.386) (7.281) (14.569) (6.832)
post ∗ seas -16.954 -11.815 -4.111 -8.737 4.063
(27.977) ( 9.631) (7.471) (14.949) (7.011)
treat ∗ post ∗ seas 52.593 25.665* 18.595* 8.296 11.444
(39.565) (13.621) (10.566) (21.141) (9.915)
p-value from placebo 0.000 0.046 0.048 0.273 0.000
observation 240 240 240 240 240
R-squared 0.3870 0.4487 0.5351 0.2662 0.3870
Standard error in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, respectively
p-value from placebo shows the p-value from placebo test on βˆ8.
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Table 1.5: Robustness Check
Dependent Total Total Simple Total Motor vehicle
variable offense assault assault larceny theft
Model
(1) 52.593+ 25.665*+ 18.595*+ 8.296 11.444+
(39.565) (13.621) (10.566) (21.141) (9.915)
(2) 3.221+ 1.624*+ 1.106+ 0.345 0.639
(2.722) (0.937) (0.727) (1.453) (0.682)
(3) 0.129 0.056*+ 0.031 0.002 0.049**
( 0.093) (0.032) (0.25) (0.049) (0.023)
(4) 44.368 18.531* 17.453** 2.973 11.548
(37.561) (10.925) (7.988) (19.641) (10.351)
(5) 26.125 10.779 11.943 -4.413 5.172
(34.698) (10.113) (7.472) (18.969) (10.383)
Standard error in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, respectively
+ indicates significance at the 10% level using placebo test.
Placebo test was not conducted in model (4) and (5).
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Chapter 2
Professional Sporting Events and
Traffic: Evidence from US Cities
2.1 Introduction
The presence of a professional sports team in a city can have a substantial impact on local
economic activity. Previous research focused primarily on assessing the tangible or intangible
benefits of professional sports teams in the local economy; relatively little focused on the
direct and indirect costs generated by professional sports teams, facilities, and the games
played in these facilities. Because of the large public subsidies provided for the construction
and operation of professional sports facilities, a research on costs associated with professional
sports is potentially important. A thorough understanding of both benefits and costs of
professional sports teams provides and important context for understanding the subsidies
provided to professional sports teams.
Most of the existing research on economic costs associated with professional sports focuses
on either financial costs associated with facility construction or crime associated with events
held in facilities. Pyun and Hall (2016) review the existing evidence on the relationship
between professional sporting events and crime. Little research focused on direct costs
generated by games like public safety, sanitation, or indirect costs like the opportunity cost
of funds used to subsidize the construction and operation of these facilities. In this paper
focuses on the relationship between professional sports events and traffic congestion, another
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overlooked cost of hosting sporting events.
Traffic congestion represents a significant problem in many urban areas. Duranton and
Turner (2011) note that in 2001, the average American household spent more than 2.5
person-hours each day in a passenger vehicle and investigate the effects of road building
and other factors on congestion. Rappaport (2016) extends the standard monocentric city
model to include commuting and identifies traffic congestion as a critical factor constraining
local growth. Krueger et al. (2009) conclude that commuting to and from work are among
urban household’s least enjoyable activities, suggesting that additional time spent in a car
at the end of the day involves substantial psychic and time costs. Holian and Kahn (2012)
investigate the relationship between urban vibrancy, traffic congestion and greenhouse gas
emissions; the presence of a professional sports team in a city could represent a type of
consumer amenity that contributes to urban vibrancy.
Professional sporting events concentrate large numbers of fans attending games in a small
area at the same time. The presence of large surface parking lots and parking structures
near sports facilities indicates that large numbers of fans drive to games. Many professional
sporting events take place on weekday evenings, and many sports facilities are located in the
urban core of large cities. Taken together, this suggests that sporting events could have a
substantial impact on traffic congestion.
We empirically analyze the relationship between attendance at Major League Baseball
(MLB) games and traffic in US metropolitan areas. MLB represents an ideal setting for
assessing the relationship between attendance at sporting events and vehicle traffic. MLB
teams typically play 81 home games per season and these games are distributed across all
days of the week. Weekday MLB games occur primarily at night, with typical start times
of 6pm to 8pm. This timing means that some fans attending games will be driving to the
game during the evening rush hour. In addition, many MLB stadiums are located in the
downtown area of cities. The impact of baseball games on traffic is likely larger than the
impact of professional football, basketball, or ice hockey because of the long baseball season
and relatively large crowds at these games. We analyze traffic data compiled by the Texas
A&M University Transportation Institute that are constructed as part of the 2015 Urban
Mobility Scorecard (UMS). The UMS provides annual estimates of traffic and congestion for
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US metropolitan areas. The aggregate annual estimates of vehicle miles traveled and conges-
tion are based on detailed micro data from the Federal Highway Administrations Highway
Performance Monitoring System (HPMS) that are highly disaggregated over space (at the
level of individual segments of roads) and time (measured at hourly intervals). Note that
these data are not directly comparable to aggregate travel data from the Federal Highway
Administration’s National Household Travel Survey.
We estimate reduced form empirical models explaining variation in vehicle-miles traveled
(VMT) for 25 large US metropolitan areas with MLB teams over the period 1990-2014. The
empirical models control for MSA population and economic conditions, stadium location,
and include MSA and year fixed effects to control for unobservable heterogeneity in factors
affecting local VMT. Instrumental variables estimates indicate that each additional 1,000
persons attending an MLB game was associated with 1,700 additional average daily vehicle-
mile traveled (DVMT) in the host city. For an MLB team drawing 2.8 million fans in a season,
this represents an increase of about 0.5% in DVMT in a metropolitan area. Note that this
increase in traffic delay time affects all vehicle occupants in the metropolitan area, not just
fans attending MLB games. Fans attending MLB games increase VMT in metropolitan
areas. This increase in VMT has implications for traffic congestion, wear and tear on roads,
and greenhouse gas emissions that affect the climate.
2.2 Sports and Traffic
Fan attendance represents the key link between sporting events and urban traffic. To
attend a sporting event, most fans travel between their home or place of work and the
venue where the event takes place. Fan attendance at professional sporting events concen-
trates economic activity spatially in and around facilities and temporally on game day. This
concentration has clear economic impacts. Humphreys and Zhou (2015) develop a spatial
economic model that includes agglomeration effects stemming from increased fan activity
in and around professional sports facilities on game day that predicts the presence of a pro
sports team will increase nearby property values and induce other service providing firms to
co-locate near the sports facility. Huang and Humphreys (2014) develop evidence of increased
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housing market activity near new sports facilities after they open, supporting the predictions
of this model. If this housing market activity reflects in-migration of new residents, the pop-
ulation density near sports facilities will increase. Coates and Humphreys (2003b) show
that employees in the amusements and recreation industry – the industry containing ath-
letes and other employees working in sports facility – earn more in cities with professional
sports teams than employees in this industry in cities without professional sports teams;
these results support the idea of increased economic activity in and near sports facilities.
Despite this evidence of increased economic activity near sporting events, no evidence exists
supporting the idea that professional sports teams or facilities generate broader economic
benefits across metropolitan areas (Coates et al., 2008).
The concentration of fans around sports facilities on game day, and increases in nearby
residents year round, has clear consequences for traffic near sports facilities. Most profes-
sional sports facilities are located in or near the Central Business District, which also contains
many firms employing large numbers of workers who travel to and from their residence on
weekdays, often by car. Many fans drive to games and park in dedicated lots surrounding
sports facilities or in nearby lots and parking structures that are also used by local workers
and residents.
A few papers in the geography literature examined the effect of sports facilities on local
parking and traffic. All are case studies and most use surveys of local residents to assess the
extent to which increased traffic, parking, crowds, and noise on game days are perceived as a
“nuisance” externality by local residents. Humphreys et al. (1983) assessed the importance
of negative externalities generated by games played in a football stadium in Southampton,
England using household surveys; this paper concluded that traffic and parked cars generated
substantially larger “nuisance” externalities on game day than crowds or noise, and the
negative effects of traffic and parking extended several miles from the stadium. Chase and
Healey (1995) assessed the importance of negative externalities generated by games and rock
concerts in a football stadium in Ipswich, England; this paper also concluded that traffic
and parked cars were the largest “nuisance” externalities associated with football matches,
and found a similarly large traffic impact area. Chase and Healey (1995) discussed proposed
stadium location decisions in Australia in light of the existing transportation environment
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around several rugby and Australian Rules Football stadiums located in the center of larger
Australian cities and Australian transportation policy initiatives. Although this paper did
not develop empirical evidence, the discussion highlights the importance of increased local
traffic and parking on game day.
Case-study based evidence clearly indicate that additional traffic around sports facili-
ties on game day represent an important “nuisance” externality to residents of areas near
stadiums in England and Australia. The existing theoretical and empirical evidence on the
spatial economic of professional sports teams in North America suggests that stadiums and
arenas concentrate fans and economic activity in and near sports facilities on game day, and
may also increase the number of businesses and residents near sports facilities. All these fac-
tors could increase traffic. However, the perceptions of residents near sports facilities about
traffic conditions on game day may not reflect outcomes across a metropolitan area, and
concentration of fans and economic activity near a sports facility may not increase overall
traffic in a metropolitan area. A full understanding of the potential impact of sporting events
on traffic in a metropolitan area requires a model of the determination of realized driving
outcomes.
2.3 Determination of Vehicle Miles Traveled
Duranton and Turner (2011) develop a model of the equilibrium determination of vehicle
miles traveled in a city. In this model, a city has road lane miles R and vehicle miles
traveled (VMT) on these roads over some specific time period Q. Both consumers and
businesses demand driving in the city, which depends on the effective price of driving P .
This effective price of driving includes direct and indirect vehicle operation costs like gas,
vehicle maintenance, and insurance, and the time and opportunity cost of driving. The
inverse demand curve for VMT, P (Q), slopes down; as the price of driving falls, firms
and households drive more miles, other things equal. Other factors unrelated to the price
of driving, like business cycle conditions, weather, changes in the price of substitutes or
compliments to driving, and increased demand for consumer goods and services that require
driving in order to consume, like sporting events, will shift the city’s demand curve for
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driving.
The supply curve for driving in a city depends on the roads in the city and the cost of
driving. Duranton and Turner (2011) posit a total variable cost function for VMT, C(R,Q)
that depends on the existing stock of roads, R and the distance driven by drivers in the
city, Q. All drivers in the city face the same average cost of driving in equilibrium. Holding
lane-miles of road constant in the city, the average cost of driving, AC(R), must increase as
VMT increases, thus the supply curve for driving is upward sloping. This result is widely
recognized in the transportation economics literature (Small and Verhoef, 2007).
Given demand and supply curves for driving in a city, and a specific quantity of roads,
equilibrium VMT in a city is Q∗, as shown on Figure 2.1. Duranton and Turner (2011) focus
on changes in the supply of road-lane miles in a city, which shifts the supply curve for driving
to the right as more roads are built, increasing equilibrium VMT in the city. Here, we focus
on short run changes in the local economy that shift the demand curve for driving to the
right, as shown on Figure 2.1. This shift in the demand curve for driving also increases
equilibrium VMT in the city from Q∗ to Q′∗.
Other models emphasize the importance of residential location choice and commuting
to work as an important determinant of urban driving decisions. Albouy and Lue (2015)
develop a model of household choice of residence location, and firm choice of location, that
makes predictions about length of commute in a standard urban monocentric city model.
However, households also drive to shop, consumer entertainment activities, and engage in
other non-work related trips. The model developed by Duranton and Turner (2011) is more
general, in that total VMT in a city is explained, rather than commuting VMT.
This model of equilibrium determination of VMT provides a useful framework for moti-
vating our empirical work. How might professional sporting events affect equilibrium VMT
in a city? Suppose that all fans attending a sporting event drive to the stadium from their
residence to watch the game, and these round-trips represent new driving that would not
have taken place if the fan did not attend the sporting event. In this case, attending the
sporting event increases demand for driving in the city, shifting the demand curve from D to
D′, as shown on Figure 2.1. If these fans live outside the area where the facility is located,
then traffic congestion will increase in the area around the facility, and potentially traffic in
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other residential areas of the city.
Alternatively, suppose that all fans drive from their residence to the facility to watch
games, but these round-trips to and from the facility replace other trips in the area that
would have been taken for other reasons. In this case, total local demand for driving is
unchanged, the demand curve for VMT does not shift, and equilibrium VMT, Q∗ does
not change. This case represents “displacement” of VMT within a city. However, traffic
congestion near the facility would still increase in this case, since fan travel to the sports
facility would not have occurred in that area absent the sporting events.
Another case arises when fans work in the area where the sports facility is located, drive
to the area at the beginning of the day and park, walk from their place of employment to the
facility, and then drive home after the game ends. To the extent that fans engage in this type
of behavior, demand for VMT does not increase, since no new driving takes place despite
attendance at the sporting event. As more fans engage in this form of travel to games, the
demand curve for VMT shifts less, and equilibrium VMT in the city remains unchanged.
This case could be associated with less congestion near the facility, since employees attending
the game do not drive home during the evening rush hour, but instead shift their evening
drive home to the post-game period.
Another possibility is fans taking some form of public transportation (bus, light rail, train,
subway) to games. If public transportation is a substitute for driving, then any fans taking
public transportation to games would decrease demand for driving in the city, reducing
equilibrium VMT. However, Duranton and Turner (2011) conclude that the presence of
public transportation has no effect on equilibrium VMT in cities. Increased use of public
transportation by some residents simply encourages additional driving by others. Based on
this result, we do not focus on public transportation options in our analysis of the relationship
between VMT and sporting events.
This model provides guidance for our empirical analysis. The model shows that our
empirical specification must include variables that shift the demand curve for driving and
also control for the supply of roads in metropolitan areas. Absent detailed data about how
individual fans travel to games, the presence of sporting events could increase VMT, or have
no effect on VMT, depending on the type of travel decisions made by individuals attending
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games.
Previous research on the determinants of metropolitan VMT identifies a number of local
factors that affect traffic volume. Salon et al. (2012) review the empirical literature on
determinants of VMT and show that factors like residential density, land use patterns, road
and parking pricing, public transport, and workplace-based programs like telecommuting
affect VMT. Road pricing, in the form of 5 to 10 cent per-mile peak-time congestion charges
on a small number of roads reduced VMT by 10% to 15% in Portland and Sacramento;
voluntary employer-based programs to reduce commuting trips reduced VMT by 5% to 6%
and marketing programs aimed at reducing single-occupance vehicle use reduced VMT by
9% to 12%.
A substantial literature analyzing the effect of short-run macroeconomic conditions on
fatal car crashes exists (Cotti and Tefft, 2011; He, 2016). This literature demonstrates that
VMT varies with short-run local macroeconomic conditions. This highlights the importance
of controlling for variation in local economic conditions on VMT. If factors like business
cycles, congestion pricing on limited local roads, and marketing programs affect VMT, it
is certainly possible that attendance at sporting events, especially MLB games which draw
large numbers of fans to specific parts of cities on 50 to 60 weeknights per year, could affect
VMT in cities.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
Following Duranton and Turner (2011), we estimate empirical models of annual VMT
in US metropolitan areas. These empirical models include variables reflecting factors that
affect demand and supply for driving. Attending professional sporting events is one factor
that affects demand for driving in US metropolitan areas. Estimating these models requires
data on VMT, road lane-miles, economic and demographic factors that affect demand for
driving, and attendance at sporting events.
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2.4.1 Data Description
Metropolitan area traffic data come from the 2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard (UMS).1 We
use total annual hours of delay as a traffic congestion measure, and daily average vehicle-miles
traveled (DVMT) as an equilibrium traffic demand and supply measure. The daily vehicle-
miles traveled data are constructed by aggregating information from individual roadway
sections at an hourly frequency for a large number of roadway segments in metropolitan
areas. An individual roadway segment typically contains from 0.5 to 1 miles of roadway.
Individual roadway segment DVMT are calculated by multiplying average daily traffic (in
terms of vehicle counts) and road miles on each roadway section.
The total annual hours of traffic delay is estimated by comparing the ratio of actual
speed to free-flow speed on each roadway section to daily vehicle miles. Lasley et al. (2014)
describe the method used to estimate annual hours of traffic delay in metropolitan areas.
Raw micro level data underlying the UMS DVMT data come from the US Department
of Highways’ Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS). Traffic speed data are from
INRIX, a company that collects urban traffic data. Annual data on the total road miles in
each metropolitan area, a measure of the supply of roadways, come from the HPMS.
Metropolitan area population estimates and unemployment rates in each year come from
the US Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Annual MLB team attendance data
were collected from daily box scores in baseball-reference.com. We include attendance at
postseason and regular season games in the MLB attendance variables.
We construct two stadium location variables to control for stadium location and existing
commuting-related traffic congestion. First, we identify stadiums located in the Central
Business District (CBD) of each metropolitan area using the CBD definition from the 1982
Census of Retail Trade (Bureau of the Census, 1985). CBDs contain high concentrations of
retail and service businesses and “high traffic flow” was one criteria used to identify CBDs.
Given this, MLB stadiums located in or near CBDs may experience higher traffic volume for
reasons unrelated to games played. The 1982 Census of Retail Trade defined the CBD for
each US MSA by listing specific streets which formed the boundary of the CBD. Based on
1This data set is constructed by the Texas A&M University Transportation Institute and available at
https://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/
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this definition, we generate a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for MLB stadiums located
in the CBD. For a stadium located outside of the CBD, we measure the driving distance
from the nearest boundary of the CBD to the stadium, as many stadiums are located just
outside of the CBD; 14 stadiums are located less than 1 mile from the nearest boundary of
the CBD. Also, the most recent definition of the CBD, from 1982, is old so there is a chance
that the CBD has grown over time and now includes these nearby stadiums. We assume that
the distance variable will capture this heterogeneity among stadiums located just outside the
1982 CBD.
The 2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard contains data from 101 metropolitan areas but only
25 are used in our analysis to address possible selection problem which are discussed below.
The sample period includes the annual data from 1990 to 2014. Although the raw traffic con-
gestion data are available from 1982, MSA level unemployment rates data are only available
after 1990.
Summary statistics are shown on Table 2.1. The total annual hours of traffic delay in
metropolitan areas in the sample is 50,876,000 hours, on average. Average DVMT is about
29 million miles with about half those miles driven on freeways and half on arterial streets.
The average metropolitan area in the sample has about 5,700 miles of roadway. Large cities
usually have higher population density and more traffic, so all traffic measures are larger in
large cities. The same argument can be applied to explain the difference in annual traffic
delays between cities with and without MLB teams. MLB teams are located in large cities,
so all traffic volume and congestion measures are larger in cities with MLB teams. About a
quarter of MLB stadiums are located in the CBD, and the average distance from the CBD
for the stadiums outside of the CBD is 1.75 miles.
Total metropolitan population varies from around 260,000 (Anchorage, AK, 1990) to over
19 million (New York, 2014). In 1999 Raleigh, NC had the lowest unemployment rate (1.5)
while in 1990 McAllen, TX had the highest (22.4). Annual MLB attendance by MSA also
varies from around 800,000 (Miami, 2002) to 8,340,000 (New York, 2008). Note that we sum
annual MLB attendance across teams if a metropolitan area has more than one MLB team.
For example, annual MLB attendance in New York is the sum of attendance for both the
Mets and the Yankees.
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2.4.2 Empirical Model
Following Duranton and Turner (2011), the basic empirical specification is a reduced
form equation for annual traffic outcome measures in metropolitan areas
Yit = αi + βMLBattit + γ
′Xit + λt + uit (2.1)
where Yit is a traffic outcome measure for metropolitan area i in year t. We use both
average DVMT and annual hours of traffic delay as dependent variables. αi and λt capture
metropolitan area fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively. Xit is a vector of control
variables which affect demand and supply for driving in metropolitan areas and vary over
time and across metropolitan areas. This vector includes annual MSA population, the MSA
unemployment rate, and total road lane-miles in the metropolitan area which reflects the
supply of roads in each metropolitan area. Duranton and Turner (2011) demonstrate the
importance of controlling for roadway supply when explaining variation in DVMT. Xit also
includes the stadium location variables. While many MLB stadiums are located in the city
center, either in the CBD or just out of the CBD, some other stadiums are located in the
suburbs and this variation in stadium location might systematically affect traffic. To control
for this heterogeneity, we include a dummy variable identifying stadiums located in the CBD,
and the driving distance from the CBD to the stadium for stadiums located outside the CBD.
uit is a mean zero, possibly heteroscedastic random error term capturing all other factors
that affect traffic outcomes in metropolitan areas.
MLBattit reflects annual attendance at MLB games in metropolitan area i in year t. We
assume this variable potentially shifts demand for driving in the metropolitan area. Note
that this attendance data is at the metropolitan area level, so we sum attendance across all
MLB teams in metropolitan areas has multiple teams. In this model, β captures the effect
of attendance at MLB games on traffic congestion in the host city. This is the parameter of
interest in this empirical model.
When estimating β, an endogeneity concern stemming from correlation between MLB
attendance and unobservable factors affecting traffic arises from two sources. First, the exis-
tence of unobserved heterogeneity in road configuration, weather, or terrain in a metropolitan
area with a MLB team might generate biased estimates of β. To address this problem, we
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limit our sample to the 25 MSAs with MLB teams.2 Our empirical results reflect variation
in traffic consitions across cities with MLB teams.
Restricting the MSAs in the sample may lead to sample selection problems. To test for
selection bias, we performed a variable addition test proposed by Wooldridge (1995). This
test procedure is as follows: first, we estimated the effect of the explanatory variables in
Equation (2.1) on selection into the sample using a separate Probit model for each year in
the sample. The explanatory variables include annual MSA population, unemployment rate,
and total road lane-miles. We cannot include the CBD location dummy, distance from the
CBD, and the instrument (team winning percentage) because these variables are equal to
zero when an MSA does not have a MLB team. For each model, we estimated the inverse
Mills ratio (IMR). Next, we included the IMR in the main empirical model, Equation (2.1)
and performed a statistical significance test on the parameter estimate on the IMR. This test
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the parameter estimate is equal to zero. In this case,
the fixed effects-2SLS estimator can address the sample selection bias (Wooldridge, 1995;
Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010).
Another endogeneity concern lies in possible unobservable heterogeneity within MSAs
with MLB teams when attendance at MLB games is correlated with unobservable factors
affecting local traffic conditions. Larger cities tend to have a larger traffic demand and larger
stadiums, and may also be associated with unobserved heterogeneity such as the presence
of consumption amenities which can affect traffic demand. To deal with this problem, we
use the winning percentage for each MLB team in each season as an instrument for MLB
attendance. Team winning percentage is highly correlated with attendance, but primarily
reflects the quality of the team relative to the rest of the league and random factors occurring
on the field. Team success should be uncorrelated with unobservable factors affecting traffic
outcomes in a metropolitan area in any year. The first-stage regression associated with
Equation (2.1), using winning percentage as an instrument, is
MLBattit = α˜ + β˜1wpg1it + β˜2wpg2it + γ˜
′Xit + λ˜t + u˜it (2.2)
2Our sample contains 25 MSAs because some cities have more than one team. We also have an unbalanced
panel, as some cities attracted teams in the sample period.
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where wpg1it indicates the MLB team’s winning percentage in city i in season t. Note that
we include two winning percentage variables for Chicago, Los Angeles, New York and San
Francisco, which all have two MLB teams. The IV estimator, two-stage least squares, uses
the predicted value from Equation (2.2) in place of actual attendance in Equation (2.1). If
the instrument is valid, the IV results have a causal interpretation; if the parameter estimate
of interest is statistically different from zero in the IV model, then attendance at MLB games
causes changes in traffic outcomes in metropolitan areas with MLB teams.
2.4.3 Results
Table 2.2 contains parameter estimates and other regression diagnostic statistics from
Equation (2.1) using both the least squared dummy variable (LSDV) estimator (a two-way
fixed effects model including both metropolitan area specific effects and year fixed effects)
and the IV estimator using MLB team winning percentage as an instrument, using average
daily vehicle-miles traveled on all roads (first two columns) and annual vehicle-hours of delay
in a metropolitan area (second two columns) as the dependent variables. Estimated standard
errors are cluster-corrected at the MSA level and account for MSA level heteroscedasticity.
The results in columns (1) and (3) use the LSDV estimator and results in columns (2) and
(4) use the IV estimator.
The LSDV parameter estimates in column (1) generally have the signs predicted by the
VMT model above. Larger cities have more DVMT, other things equal. Cities with more
miles of roads have more DVMT, which confirms the results reported by Duranton and
Turner (2011), the “fundamental law of road congestion.”3 The parameter estimates on
the local unemployment rate variable is negative, suggesting that driving demand is cyclical,
rising during expansions and falling during recessions; fewer people working in a metropolitan
area means fewer people commuting to work, and lower DVMT.
The parameter estimate of interest is on the MLB attendance variable. We expect the
sign of this parameter estimate to be positive; more fans in the stands at MLB games means
more people driving to the game. This should increase DVMT. The results in columns
3Duranton and Turner (2011) estimate both LSDV models and IV models that treat total road miles as
endogenous.
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(1) and (2) confirm this, both parameter estimates are positive and significantly different
from zero. The size of this parameter estimate from the LSDV model suggests that each
additional 1,000 people attending an MLB game increases DVMT by 1,320 vehicle-miles, on
average, holding other factors constant. The average MLB team in the sample drew about
2.8 million fans to games. The parameter estimate on column (1) suggests that this number
of fans attending games would increase average DVMT by 3.70 million vehicle-miles. More
vehicle-miles traveled in a metropolitan area, holding the number of miles of roads constant,
means more congestion on the roads in that metropolitan area. The presence of a MLB team
increases traffic congestion in cities, and the more fans that attend games, the worse is the
traffic congestion. This applies to all residents of the metropolitan area, not just those who
attend MLB games. In this sense, the additional traffic congestion is a negative externality
in cities.
The results in columns (2) use the IV estimator, and can be interpreted as causal if
the instrument is valid. Table 2.2 reports the standard first-stage (Stock-Yogo) F-statistic
for instrument strength. These statistics indicate that our instruments are valid for both
models. From column (2), the parameter estimate on MLB attendance in the IV model is
positive and statistically different from zero. Fans attending MLB games cause increases in
DVMT in metropolitan areas. The increase caused by MLB attendance of 2.8 million, the
average attendance in the sample, is 0.5%, bigger than the LSDV results on Column (1).
DVMT is higher in cities with an MLB stadium located in the CBD, relative to cities
where the stadium is located in the suburbs. Distance between stadiums nearby and the
CBD is not associated with additional DVMT.
While the sample analyzed here contains only metropolitan areas with MLB teams, these
results have implications for cities that attract a new MLB team. When a city without one
attracts a new MLB team, MLB attendance in that city goes from zero to some positive
amount of attendance. Since the IV results on Table 2.2 indicate that higher MLB atten-
dance causes increases in DVMT and traffic congestion, going from zero attendance at MLB
games to several million fans attending games would also cause increases in urban traffic.
Unfortunately, we lack access to sufficient traffic data to estimate the size of this effect.
The results on Table 2.2 indicate that attendance at MLB games causes increased DVMT,
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but this does not mean that time spent in traffic also increases. The additional miles traveled
to and from MLB games could occur at off-peak times, which would not affect time spent
in traffic delays much. To assess the effect of MLB games on time spent in traffic delays,
we estimate Equation (2.1) using estimated annual metropolitan area vehicle-hours of delay
as the dependent variable. This variable is estimated using both DVMT and differences
in traffic speed during off-peak “free flow” periods (late evenings and weekends) relative to
traffic speed during peak periods on weekdays during the day and early evening. Like the
DVMT data, the vehicle-hours of delay estimates are aggregated up from detailed data for
specific roadway segments. However, these estimates are noisier than the DVMT estimates
because they use data from both the HPMS (VMT) and INRIX (speed). These variables
are collected in different ways by different organizations. Because of these problems, the
vehicle-hours of delay variable needs to be interpreted with some caution as it may contain
substantial measurement error of an unknown form because of matching issues.
The last two columns on Table 2.2 contain LSDV and IV results from Equation (2.1)
when the dependent variable is total vehicle-hours of delay in each metropolitan area. The
results in column (3), based on the LSDV estimator indicate that attendance at MLB games
is associated with additional time spent in traffic delays equal to a 2% increase in time spent
in delays.
The parameter estimates on the metropolitan population variable is positive and statisti-
cally different from zero in both models. This indicates that residents of more populous cities
spend more time in traffic delays than residents of less populous cites, other things equal.
The parameter estimate on the variable reflecting the total road miles in the metropolitan
area is not statistically different from zero in either model. Building more roads neither
increases or decreases traffic delays in a city. This is consistent with the “fundamental law
of road congestion” reported by Duranton and Turner (2011), which shows that building
more roads causes more VMT in a metropolitan area, with an elasticity of new road con-
struction of about 1. If roads increase by 1% and VMT increases by 1%, traffic delays could
be unchanged.
The IV results in columns (4) shows a significant relationship between MLB attendance
and traffic delays. The estimated coefficient represents an increase of about 2% for the
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average metropolitan area with an MLB team in the sample. Note that the cites in this
sample also have professional football, basketball, and ice hockey teams that also attract
fans to games. The impact of these other sporting events on traffic and congestion is unclear.
Most professional football games take place on Sunday afternoons, and professional football
teams only play 8-10 home games per season. While attendance at these games is larger
than MLB attendance, traffic is lighter on Sunday, so driving to Sunday afternoon football
games may not generate the same amount of congestion. Professional basketball and ice
hockey games frequently occur on weeknights, but these games draw smaller crowds than
baseball (average game attendance is roughly 15,000 to 18,000) and the teams only play
about 40 home games per season. The overall impact of these sporting events on traffic and
congestion is likely much smaller than the impact of baseball games.
Next, we disaggregate the DVMT data by interstate and arterial road VMT. Interstates
are limited access divided highways; arterial roads are commonly called “surface streets”.
Most of the roads immediately surrounding MLB stadiums are arterial streets, but most
MLB stadiums are also located near one or more interstate highways, so the effect of MLB
attendance on arterial streets could differ from the effect on interstates. While all interstate
road miles contain no stoplights or stop signs, arterial streets have many such traffic restric-
tions. State departments of transportation maintain all interstates and some arterial streets.
Recall that in most cities in the sample, DVMT is about the same on interstates and arterial
streets.
Table 2.3 shows results for both the LSDV estimator and the IV estimator when the
dependent variable is defined as average DVMT on interstates (first two columns) and arterial
roads (second two columns). Columns (1) and (3) use the LSDV estimator; columns (2) and
(4) use the IV estimator with annual MLB team winning percentage as the instrument for
attendance. The first two columns on Table 2.3 contain evidence that fans attending MLB
games increase DVMT on interstates in metropolitan areas. Both LSDV and IV model
results support this. The parameter estimates on the unemployment rate variables and the
miles of road variables are not generally statistically different from zero in these models.
Last two columns on Table 2.3 shows results for both the LSDV estimator and the IV
estimator when the dependent variable is defined as average DVMT on arterial streets.
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Column (3) uses the LSDV estimator and columns (4) use the IV estimator with annual
MLB team winning percentage as the instrument for annual MLB attendance.
The results on Table 2.3 indicate that MLB attendance causes increases in total DVMT
primarily work through VMT on interstates. The estimated parameters on the total MLB
attendance variable are positive and statistically significant for both the LSDV model and
the IV model in the first two columns while the estimated parameters are not significant in
the last two columns on Table 2.3. This suggests that the increase in DVMT caused by MLB
games must be attributable to additional miles driven on interstates. Most fans traveling to
and from MLB games travel on interstates, not arterial roads.
The other parameter estimates on Table 2.3 generally have the expected sign and are
statistically different from zero. Metropolitan population and the total miles of roads in the
metropolitan area are both associated with larger DVMT.
2.4.4 Robustness Checks
While we used an IV approach to address potential endogeneity in the MLB attendance
variable, it is possible that additional econometric problems exist. One possible problem
might come from the unbalanced sample. In this sample period, 5 cities (Denver, Miami,
Phoenix, Tampa and Washington DC) either gained a new MLB team or attracted an existing
team. This decision might be correlated with other unobserved factors affecting traffic in
these cities. To address this problem, we perform a sensitivity test using the subsample which
excludes these 5 cities. While we lose observations in this restricted sample, the results from
this reduced sample will look similar to the original results if the unbalanced sample does
not create any econometric problems.
Another concern arises from metropolitan areas with two teams. In our sample, four
metropolitan areas (Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco/Oakland, and New York) have
two teams throughout the sample period. The existence of two teams might affect a traffic
demand in a city differently than a single team. These large metropolitan areas could also
have some other unobserved features that have a different impact on traffic. To address this
problem, we exclude these 4 metropolitan areas from the restricted sample. This restricted
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sample also helps to determine the extent to which traffic in these four large metropolitan
areas drives the results.
Results from these robustness checks are shown in Table 2.4. On this table, only the
coefficient estimates of interest, βˆ (the parameter estimate on the MLB attendance variable)
and the estimated standard error on this parameter are shown using the IV estimator. The
”Full 25 team MLB MSAs” sample reproduces the original results from Tables 2.2 and 2.3;
the “ Balanced Sample” represents results using only cities home to an MLB team for the
entire period. The ”Excluding cities with two teams” sample represents results excluding
the four large metropolitan areas with two MLB teams. The results look similar to our
main results both qualitatively and quantitatively. One difference is the model using annual
vehicle-hours of delay as the dependent variable. The effect of MLB attendance on annual
vehicle hours of delay loses statistical significance when excluding the four large metropolitan
areas with two teams. This might indicate that the estimated effects on hours of delay are
driven by these large metropolitan areas. Also, the parameter estimate for arterial roads
VMT becomes statistically significant when excluding these four larger metropolitan areas.
The results reported on Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are generally robust to these sample restric-
tions. Even when focusing only on metropolitan areas with one MLB team, vehicle-miles
traveled in metropolitan areas increases with attendance at MLB games.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper examines the extent to which attendance at MLB games increases traffic
volume and congestion in host cities. Using traffic volume and congestion data from the
2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard for 25 US cities with MLB teams from 1990 to 2014, we
empirically estimate the effect of annual MLB attendance on traffic volume and congestion
after controlling for factors that affect demand and supply of driving, economic conditions,
and unobservable city and year heterogeneity. Our main results suggest that each additional
1,000 fans attending MLB games increases average daily vehicle-miles traveled by 1,749 miles,
which implies a 0.5% increase in total annual vehicle-miles traveled in a city with annual
MLB attendance of 2.8 million, the sample average. This paper also finds a weak evidence of
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an effect of MLB attendance on total annual hours of delay from traffic congestion, although
this may be driven by traffic conditions in the four larger metropolitan areas with two MLB
teams in the sample.
These results reflect only attendance at MLB games. The cities in the sample also host
National Football League, National Basketball Association, and National Hockey League
games. Attendance at these games is substantial, and many of the games in these leagues
also occur on weeknights. If fans driving to these games have a similar effect on urban traffic,
then the overall effect of professional sports on urban VMT and road congestion is larger
than the evidence developed here suggests.
Negative congestion externalities are often overlooked when assessing the net local effect
of public subsidization of sports facility construction, which is common in the US. Our results
suggest that significant increases game-related traffic exist in cities with MLB teams, which
leads to substantial social costs. While professional sports may contribute to vibrancy in
urban areas, they may not lead to reductions in VMT and greenhouse gas emissions like other
factors analyzed by Holian and Kahn (2012). Therefore, urban policymakers contemplating
a subsidy for a new professional sports facility, or attracting a team from another city to
increase local vibrancy, should take into account this negative consequence.
While this paper is the first to estimate the effect of game attendance on urban traffic
volume, we could not quantify this effect in monetary terms. Additional research exploring
the social costs created by increased game-related traffic are clearly needed. Also, using
aggregated city-level and annual data might obscure the underlying effects of MLB games
on traffic volume. It is possible that MLB games create traffic jams in areas around the
stadium and reduce traffic in other parts of the city. It is also possible that 81 home games
(or around 55 home games on weekdays) are not sufficient to affect outcomes aggregated
across a calendar year over entire metropolitan areas. These problems could be addressed
by analyzing micro-level data in future research.
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Figure 2.1: Supply, Demand, and Equilibrium VMT
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample no MLB team MLB team in MSA
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Average daily vehicle-miles traveled (000) 29383 37907 14303 9408 70728 552945
Total annual hours delay (000) 50876 85747 21128 19142 132430 132082
Interstate daily vehicle-miles traveled (000) 14642 19648 6881 5109 35919 27489
Arterial daily vehicle-miles traveled (000) 14741 18687 7421 4749 34808 26378
MSA Population (000) 2039 2613 1060 676 4723 3804
MSA unemployment rate 5.96 2.51 6.02 2.69 4.57 2.93
MSA total road miles 5777 6249 3133 1614 13028 8203
Annual MLB attendance 755766 1443059 — — 2827696 1390079
Stadium in CBD 0.067 0.25 — — 0.25 0.43
Distance from CBD 0.47 1.57 — — 1.75 2.65
Observations 2200 1612 588
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Table 2.2: Regression Results, Dependent Variables: Miles Traveled and Delay
Dependent Variable Average Daily Annual
Vehicle-Miles Traveled Vehicle-Hours of Delay
Model (1) LSDV (2) IV (3) LSDV (4) IV
MLB attendance (000) 1.322* 1.749** 10.74** 9.913**
(0.753) (0.818) (4.254) (3.910)
Population (000) 15.26*** 15.18*** 62.85*** 63.01***
(2.791) (2.607) (18.11) (17.56)
Unemployment rates -882.1 -870.2* -5212** -5235**
(570.085) (527.531) (2252) (2188)
Total road miles 0.843** 0.855** 0.601 0.578
(0.393) (0.374) (1.574) (1.490)
Stadium in CBD 2951*** 3017*** 4033 3904
(926.6) (873.1) (7299) (6821)
Distance from CBD 434.8 459.1 3441 3394
(364.7) (355.2) (2194) (2079)
City & year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Instrument MLB Win % MLB Win %
First stage F statistic 79.8 79.8
Number of cities 25 25 25 25
Years 25 25 25 25
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Cluster-corrected standard errors at MSA level in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Interstate and Arterial Miles Traveled
Dependent Variable Daily Interstate Daily Arterial Road
Vehicle-Miles Traveled Vehicle-Miles Traveled
Model (1) LSDV (2) IV (3) LSDV (4) IV
MLB attendance (000) 0.811** 0.883** 0.511 0.866
(0.314) (0.350) (0.492) (0.563)
Population (000) 8.612*** 8.598*** 6.653*** 6.586***
(0.775) (0.746) (2.227) (2.060)
Unemployment rates -445.9* -443.9* -436.1 -426.3
(254.2) (239.0) (350.7) (320.5)
Total road miles 0.145 0.147 0.699** 0.708***
(0.147) (0.137) (0.286) (0.275)
Stadiums in CBD 1227 1239 1723* 1778**
(903.0) (870.2) (892.4) (756.9)
Distance from CBD 246.5 250.6 188.3 208.5
(204.8) (197.1) (228.7) (221.8)
City & year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Instrument MLB Win % MLB Win %
First stage F statistic 79.8 79.8
Number of cities 25 25 25 25
Years 25 25 25 25
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Cluster-corrected standard errors at MSA level in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Robustness Checks - IV Estimator
Dependent Variable Sample βˆ / s. e.
Average Daily Vehicle-Miles Traveled Full 25 MLB MSAs 1.749**
(0.818)
Balanced Sample 1.867**
(0.792)
Excluding cities with two teams 1.947***
(0.696)
Annual vehicle-hours of delay Full 25 MLB MSAs 9.913**
(3.910)
Balanced Sample 10.16***
(3.712)
Excluding cities with two teams 1.886
(1.565)
Daily Interstate Vehicle-Miles Traveled Full 25 MLB MSAs 0.883**
(0.350)
Balanced Sample 1.001***
(0.326)
Excluding cities with two teams 1.069***
(0.340)
Daily Arterial Road Vehicle-Miles Traveled Full 25 MLB MSAs 0.866
(0.563)
Balanced Sample 0.866
(0.554)
Excluding cities with two teams 0.877**
(0.442)
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Cluster-corrected standard errors at MSA level in parentheses.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Smoking Cessation on
Health Outcomes: Evidence from the
British Household Panel Survey
3.1 Introduction
Cigarette smoking affects health. Among the 7,000 chemicals in tobacco smoke, at least
250 are known to be harmful and can cause cancer or other diseases (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 2014). However, empirical analysis of the effect of smoking faces
several empirical challenges including self-selection bias and reverse-causation. Smoking and
smoking cessation cannot be assigned randomly to individuals, so empirical research on the
impact of smoking and smoking cessation must use observational, non-experimental data. In
this case, the estimated effect of smoking or smoking cessation can be biased when smokers
undertake more other unhealthy behaviors than non-smokers or when survey participants
systematically differ from the general population. Empirical analysis of smoking cessation
and health outcomes can suffer from reverse causality if quitters stop smoking because of
some unobserved smoking-related health problems.
In health economics, a number of papers address the self-selection problem in the context
of smoking behavior. For example, Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Balia and Jones (2008)
apply a recursive multivariate probit model to address the self-selection problem and find a
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negative impact of smoking on self-reported health and mortality rates1. Adda and Lechene
(2013) showed the existence of health selection effects in smoking decisions and found that
the effects of smoking varied systematically with smoking intensity. However, the estimated
effects of smoking on health outcomes are mostly driven by observed differences between
current smokers and non-smokers while government smoking policy interventions policies
tend to concentrate on smoking cessation. The impact of smoking cessation programs on
health outcomes should be shown in observed variation between current smokers and former
smokers. The paper compares health outcomes of current smokers with former smokers after
quitting.
In 2016, the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion spent $70 million on the National Tobacco Control program and the Quitline program2.
These programs aim to prevent initiation of tobacco use especially among youth and young
adults, and to promote cessation and assist tobacco users to quit. Evaluation of these pro-
grams requires information about the effect of smoking cessation on health outcomes. The
estimated effect of smoking cessation on health outcomes would likely be smaller than the
effect of current smoking on health outcomes, as quitters smoked prior to cessation, and past
smoking behavior already affected their health negatively. No recent studies try to estimate
this effect despite the existence of new techniques to deal with self-selection.
This paper estimates the impact of smoking cessation on health outcomes. Using the
most recent 10 years of data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), this paper
explores the short-term and long-term effects of smoking cessation. To focus on the impact of
smoking cessation, I define quitting behavior as the treatment in the empirical analysis and
address self-selection by applying a propensity score matching technique. The results show
a positive impact of smoking cessation on self-reported health after controlling for smoking
intensity, in terms of number of cigarette smoked or smoking tenure (i.e., the number of
years an individual reported smoking); at the average smoking intensity, quitters were 6% to
8% more likely to report positive health outcomes than inconsistent smokers. These results
1Bhattacharya et al. (2006) provide evidence that a multivariate (bivariate) probit model is preferred to
an instrumental variable approach with multiple binary dependent variables.
2Source: https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/about/osh/program-funding/index.htm
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are useful for evaluating the effectiveness of smoking cessation programs.
3.2 Literature Review
Most research on smoking cessation comes from clinical or epidemiological fields. Early
studies in these areas mostly reported positive effects of smoking cessation on health out-
comes like mortality. Epidemiological mortality studies found decreases in mortality rates
among former smokers 10% to 30% lower than current smokers (Doll and Peto, 1976; Ham-
mond, 1966; Kahn, 1966; Carstensen et al., 1987)3. These studies analyzed both short-term
and long-term health impacts of smoking cessation and found that the impact on health
increased with the duration of smoking cessation. Also, some studies found a differential
effect of smoking cessation by smoking intensity (Hammond, 1966; Kahn, 1966; Carstensen
et al., 1987).
Other studies used the number of hospitalized days as the health outcome, or the number
of physician visits and the number of hospitalized days. The estimated effect of smoking
cessation on these health outcomes was varied. Ashford (1973) reported no consistent impact
of smoking cessation on physician visits, Oakes et al. (1974) found that former smokers had
more physician visits than current smokers, and Vogt and Schweitzer (1985) found that
former smokers had fewer physician visits after controlling for age, gender, and alcohol
use. Other papers looked at survey data and mostly focused on informal health outcome
measures, like self-reported health status or absence from work. These studies consistently
found a positive effect of smoking cessation (Balarajan et al., 1985; Segovia et al., 1989).
Previous findings discussed above were estimated using data with some limitations: the
studies were constructed with either too specific a sample (e.g., UK doctors only; Doll and
Peto (1976), a single city case study; Ashford (1973), small sample size (e.g., less than 3,000
participants; Segovia et al. (1989); Oakes et al. (1974); Vogt and Schweitzer (1985)), or cross-
sectional data only (Ashford, 1973; Oakes et al., 1974; Vogt and Schweitzer, 1985; Balarajan
et al., 1985; Segovia et al., 1989). Studies with a mortality follow-up relied on a one (or two)
time survey question on smoking status and socio-economic status (Doll and Peto, 1976;
3Doll et al. (2004) update the results with 50 years’ mortality follow-up.
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Kahn, 1966; Carstensen et al., 1987). Hammond (1966) used panel data observed only 4
times at annual intervals.
The US Surgeon General Report regularly summarizes existing research on the health
consequences of smoking; the 1990 report focused on research on smoking cessation. This
report described six possible problems in the empirical literature on smoking cessation: 1)
self-reported former smokers are actually smoking, 2) former smokers tend to have smoked
less than persistent smokers, 3) smoking practices and the presence of smoking-related dis-
eases affect participation in studies, 4) small numbers of subjects in studies, 5) former smokers
tend to lead a healthier lifestyle than persistent smokers, and 6) current smokers developing
symptoms of disease quit smoking (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1990).
The studies discussed above did not address these problems.
There are some recent studies on smoking cessation in medical fields. For example, Jha
et al. (2013) estimate hazards of smoking and benefits of cessation using US National Health
Interview Survey data. While they defined smoking status carefully and controlled for socio-
economic characteristics and drinking behavior, they failed to address the problems listed in
the Surgeon General Report.
This paper address the empirical issues identified in the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (1990) by applying propensity score matching. Among the listed problems,
I focus on the issues from self-selection and reverse causation. Reverse causation would gen-
erate overestimated effects of quitting if the estimated effects of quitting capture changes in
health reflecting contemporaneous poor health status (for example when a former smoker
quit smoking because her health status deteriorated prior to quitting). Stratification on
the propensity score from a sample of inconsistent smokers can address the reverse causal-
ity effect of poor health on quitting. Also, the number of cigarettes smoked and smoking
tenure is controlled for through the matching technique. The effect of other health-related
behaviors are controlled for in the matching technique. The British Household Panel Survey
contains a relatively large number of nationally representative individuals and more frequent
observations as the same smoking-related questions were asked in every wave of the survey.
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3.3 Data
The data analyzed in this paper come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
The BHPS contains an annual longitudinal survey of approximately 4,000 to 10,000 individ-
uals for 18 waves (years) from 1991 to 2008. Data from the most recent 10 waves (1999-2008)
are analyzed in this paper as questions regarding health-related behaviors such as partici-
pation in physical activity and drinking only appear in recent waves. The sample contains
only individuals who appear in all 10 waves.
Each wave contains a question asking about current smoking status and the number of
cigarettes smoked per day for smokers. From this question, I define all time smokers as
those individuals who report themselves as smoking in all 10 waves and quitters as those
who report smoking in earlier waves, quit at some point, and report not smoking for at
least 5 consecutive waves. I also define all time non-smokers as those individuals who report
themselves as not smoking in all 10 waves and inconsistent smokers as those individuals who
report themselves as smoking in some waves but not smoking in other waves. Others include
individuals who did not report their smoking status for all waves; they are dropped in this
paper. Table 3.1 shows the frequency distribution for the various smoking groups.
This paper focuses on the inconsistent smoker and quitter groups only to correct for self-
selection and reserve causation problems. Excluding the largest portion of individuals might
be problematic as members of the remaining groups could be systematically different from
the rest of the sample. But smoking or quitting cannot be assigned randomly, as mentioned
earlier. Given this limitation, this paper addresses the problem of self-selection into the
quitting group using propensity score matching. More discussion of the matching method
will follow.
The BHPS also contains a question about each individual’s health status. This question
asks about self-reported overall health over last 12 months using 5 possible responses: excel-
lent, good, fair, poor, and very poor. Following Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Balia and
Jones (2008), I create a dummy variable for self-reported health which is equal to 1 when an
individual reports his/her health as excellent and good, and 0 otherwise.
The propensity score matching uses variables capturing socio-economic status from the
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BHPS as covariates. These variables include age, annual income, gender, marital status,
number of children, higher education, self-employment, retirement status, dummy variables
for geographical residence, and a social class classification variable.4
Variables reflecting health-related behaviors are also included in the BHPS. The survey
contains questions asking about participation in physical activity and drinking. The ques-
tions ask whether an individual participates in physical activity (e.g., walking or swimming)
or goes for a drink at a pub or club with following categories: at least once a week, once
a month, several times a year, once a year or less, and never. I define a dummy variable
which equals 1 when an individual participates in physical activity (goes out for a drink) at
least once a week, and 0 otherwise. These questions are only asked once every two years. I
assume that individuals maintain their behavior over a two year period.
The BHPS also contains questions regarding smoking intensity. The number of cigarettes
smoked is recorded in every wave. Wave 9 contained a question asking the age when an
individual first started to smoke cigarettes regularly. Using this first smoking age and current
age, smoking tenure (the number of continuous years of smoking) is calculated.
3.4 Empirical Methods
3.4.1 Definition of Treatment and Control Groups
To concentrate on the effect of smoking cessation, I define the treatment group as quitters
and inconsistent smokers as the control group. The ideal control group would be all time
smokers as they did not experience any changes in their smoking behavior in all 10 waves.
However, reverse causality can not be addressed with the all time smoker group as quitters
are systematically different from all time smokers. I found evidence that quitters are likely
to report their health status as fair and poor when they quit smoking compared to all
time smokers. The fair/poor health reports by quitters also exist over the first two years
of smoking cessation. This reverse causation is not addressed with the propensity score
matching on the all time smoker group and the estimated effect of smoking cessation would
4Following Contoyannis and Jones (2004); Balia and Jones (2008), the social class classification is derived
from the Registrar Generals Social Class (RGSC), which is based on reported occupation.
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be overstated as a result. On the other hand, inconsistent smokers are individuals who
stopped smoking at some point but failed to quit permanently. In this case, inconsistent
smokers can resemble the quitter group better than all time smokers as their motivation
to stop smoking would be similar to the quitters’ motivation. Propensity score matching
with stratification is applied to the sample of inconsistent smokers to deal with remaining
problems from self-selection and reverse causation. Details on this approach are discussed
in the next section.
Among inconsistent smokers, focusing on a group of individuals who attempted to stop
smoking at the same time with quitters but could not quit successfully would generate an
interesting control group. Note that quitters are the group of individuals who started to
quit smoking in the first 5 waves following the group definition and the whole inconsistent
smokers includes many individuals who stopped smoking in the later waves. This subgroup of
whole inconsitent smoker includes individuals who stopped smoking in this first 5 waves with
quitters, but started to smoke again in the later waves. Intuitively, this group of individuals
are likely to be very similar to quitters except for their success in smoking cessation, as they
made the decision to quit at the same time. This group of individuals may have stopped
smoking because they develop a health problem, like individuals in the former smokers group.
Therefore, I use this group of individuals as a second control group. Since the size of this
group is smaller than the whole sample of inconsistent smokers and close to the size of the
quitter group, propensity score matching is not applied to this group. I will call the first
control group “whole inconsistent smokers” and the second control group with individuals
who tried to quit smoking but failed as the “failure group.”
3.4.2 Propensity Score Matching
Before estimating the treatment effect of smoking cessation, propensity score matching
is employed to construct an appropriate control group from the sample of inconsistent smok-
ers. The matching technique assumes that outcomes are independent of group participation
(quitting) conditional on a set of observed variables. I select variables which are likely to
determine the probability of quitting, which include age, income, gender, marital status, the
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number of children, education, self-employed status, retirement status, social class classifi-
cation, dummy variables for resident location, the number of cigarettes smoked per day, and
smoking tenure. Following Gaynor et al. (2012), I use the three closest matches for each
quitter with replacement. As quitters stop smoking in various waves, matching is performed
separately using observations for quitters and smokers from the same wave. As quitters are as
defined those who quit smoking for at least 5 years, the decision to quit was made in the first
five waves. Therefore, five separate matching procedures were performed. When matching, I
use data from the wave when the treated individual actually quit smoking. Propensity score
matching usually employs data from before the assignment of any treatment. Matching on
data from different waves might be problematic, but the BHPS asks about current smoking
status and other covariates based on the past full year, so I assume that the quitting decision
was made after the covariates used in matching were determined.
This matching method is also required to address any possible reverse causality. Quitters
tend to report worse health in the year when they quit smoking. Using data from waves
before the quitting decision was made would not completely address this problem.
To address reverse causality, I stratify the sample according to self-reported health in the
quitting group following Lechner (2009). Generally, for an individual who reported his/her
health status as excellent or good (fair or poor) and reported she quit smoking in a specific
wave, I applied the matching method to the group of inconsistent smokers who reported
their health status as excellent or good (fair or poor) in the same wave. This method
ensures that differences in covariates are not affected by health status, which can generate
reverse causality in this setting.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for variables used in matching from the 2000 wave.
The first column shows averages for the quitter (treatment) group, the next two columns
show averages for the whole inconsistent smokers control group before and after matching.
Stars indicate p-values from a t-test of differences in means between the treatment and
control groups. As shown, several statistically significant differences between the groups
exist before matching. But these differences do not exist after matching, except in the case
of the number of cigarettes smoked. Note that actual matching is performed using data
from 5 different waves separately; this table only shows approximate results from one waves
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matching. The last column shows averages for the failure control group. Since propensity
score matching is not performed for this group due to the small size, several variables report
a statistically significant difference across groups. However, this group represents the quitter
group well intuitively and shows a more similar pre-trend in self-reported health, as shown
in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 shows the trends in pre- and post-treatment (smoking cessation) health out-
comes for quitters and smokers. The vertical red line represents the timing of the decision
to quit. As shown in the figure, both control groups closely resemble the pre-trend of health
status for quitters. While the whole inconsistent smokers group shows marginally worse
health reports for some pre-quitting periods, the failure group exhibits a similar time trend
to quitters, which supports the idea that the failure group resembles the quitter group. Also,
reverse causation is addressed in this context, as no large difference exists in health status at
the red (quitting) line. Note that these figures only show unconditional means by quitting
year. Assessing the treatment effect would require conditioning on time fixed effects, as the
quitting decision was made in different years, as well as controlling for heterogeneous effects
by smoking intensity.
3.4.3 Difference-in-Differences Model
After applying propensity score matching, a difference-in-difference approach is used to
estimate the treatment effect:
healthit = β0+β1treati+β2quitit+β3quitit∗#cigarettei+β4quitit∗smokingtenurei+λt+uit
(3.1)
where healthit indicates the specific health outcome for individual i in year t. As mentioned, I
use self-reported health status as the relevant health outcome. treati equals 1 if an individual
i is in the quitter (treatment) group for all waves. λt captures year-fixed effects, uit is an
unobservable error term reflecting other unobservable factors that influence health. quitit
is the variable of interest, which equals 1 if an individual i stops smoking in wave t, and
further subsequent waves. In this specification, β2 captures the treatment effect of quitting.
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Positive estimates of β2 indicate a positive impact of smoking cessation on health outcomes.
Individual fixed effects are not included in the regression model as heterogeneity among
individuals is already controlled through propensity score matching.
Smoking intensity and smoking tenure (i.e., the number of continuous years an individual
reported smoking) generate heterogenous effects of smoking cessation on health. For exam-
ple, Adda and Cornaglia (2006) report differences in the health effects of increased smoking
intensity generated by cigarette tax increases. To control for smoking intensity, the num-
ber of cigarettes smoked per day and smoking tenure are included in the empirical model.
quitit∗#cigarettei and quitit∗smokingtenurei indicates the interaction terms between quitit
and the number of cigarettes smoked before quitting and smoking tenure. β3 and β4 captures
the heterogenous effect of quitting according to smoking intensity. I expect β3 and β4 be
negative.
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 shows the results from Equation (3.1) for the two different control groups. The
first column shows results for the whole inconsistent smokers control group, and the last
column shows results for the failure control group. The estimated coefficients on the treated
group is not statistically different from zero for both control groups. This result indicates
that there are no differences between the control group and treatment group except for
quitting behavior, which supports the idea that the two control groups represent the quitter
group in pre-quitting periods reasonably well.
The estimated treatment effects are positive and statistically significant after controlling
for smoking intensity and tenure. For example, the probability that an individual reports
their health as excellent or good after quitting increases by 27 to 28 percentage points.
However, these effects are reduced by prior smoking intensity and tenure. Each additional
cigarette smoked per day before quitting decreases this impact by 0.8 percentage points.
The average number of cigarettes smoked for each quitter was 9.6, which generates a 7.7
percentage point decrease in the treatment effect. Smoking tenure also decreases the esti-
mated treatment effect by 0.5 percentage points. At the average smoking tenure for quitters
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(26.83 years), the estimated treatment effects will be reduced by 13.4 percentage points.
As a result, the probability of reporting good or excellent health for the average quitter is
5 to 6 percentage points higher after quitting. Based on the average self-reported health
for quitters before quitting (74.9%), the estimated effects represents an 8% increase in the
likelihood of improved self-reported health outcomes.
3.6 Robustness Checks
Several alternative specifications are estimated to confirm that the estimated treatment
effects are driven by smoking behavior. The BHPS contains questions asking about individ-
ual’s specific health problems. Among these questions, I choose one question asking whether
an individual has problems with chest/breathing, asthma, or bronchitis. Respiratory prob-
lems are closely related to smoking behavior and the estimated effect on this problem should
show up clearly if variation in smoking is well identified. Therefore, I estimate Equation
(3.1) with a dependent variable that equals 1 when an individual reports chest/breathing
problems, asthma, or bronchitis.
Questions in the BHPS also ask about other diseases such as skin allergies, digestive prob-
lems, and epilepsy. These health problems are not likely to be correlated with smoking and
the estimated effect of quitting on these problems should generate insignificant coefficient
estimates if the treatment effect is well identified and does not contains confounding factors
or reverse causation (e.g., if only generally healthy individuals quit smoking, estimated coef-
ficient effects would capture difference in overall health status between the two groups, and
would not be driven by smoking cessation). Therefore, I estimate the treatment effects on
these variables as a falsification test and expect the changes in these health variables will
not be related to smoking cessation.
Table 3.4 shows the results from the robustness checks. The first two columns show the
results using breathing problem as the relevant health outcome. As shown, the estimated
coefficients closely resemble the earlier results for self-reported health status. Note that the
dependent variable is now equal to one when an individual reports respiratory problems.
Smoking cessation reduces the likelihood of reporting this health problem by 19 to 20 per-
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centage points, and the treatment effects are reduced by prior smoking intensity and tenure,
as expected. Using the average number of cigarettes smoked and the smoking tenure for each
quitter, the average treatment effect is a 4 to 5 percentage point decrease in the likelihood
of reporting respiratory problems. This can be interpreted as a 30% reduction in reported
respiratory problems from the average reported rate (13.3%) for a quitter before quitting.
The next 6 columns show the results from the falsification tests. For all the alternative
health outcomes, the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero: smoking
cessation has no impact on skin allergies, digestive problems, and epilepsy.
The main results are generally robust to these alternative specifications. Improved health
status is more likely to be caused by smoking cessation through an improvement of the
respiratory system. Smoking cessation has no impact on unrelated diseases, as expected.
3.7 Discussion
The estimated effects of smoking cessation in this paper only show a 5 to 6 percentage
point, or 8%, increase in positive self-reported health; this is smaller than reported in previ-
ous research. For example, Segovia et al. (1989) reports 22% increases in positive health for
a former smokers one year after quitting compared to current smokers with 11-15 cigarette
smoked. However, this finding does not address any empirical challenges related to estimat-
ing a causal relationship. As mentioned above, this paper uses appropriate control groups
generated by propensity score matching, and successfully addresses the reverse causation
problem with a large, nationally representative sample. This paper also controls for other
individual behavior rather than smoking, which affects health outcomes when applying a
matching technique.
Due to data limitations, this paper uses self-reported health as a health outcome. Ben-
jamins et al. (2004) looked at the relationship between self-reported health and mortality
rates by specific causes of death. This result is useful for relating the estimated effects in this
paper to mortality rates, since smoking cessation has a positive impact on health through
improvements in the respiratory system, as shown above. I focus only on changes in health
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status from fair to good to deal with differences in health measures5, and this is the main
variation in the dependent variable in this paper6. From the findings in Benjamins et al.
(2004), mortality rates caused by respiratory disease declined by 30% when an individual’s
health moved from fair to good. Using the estimated treatment effects in this paper, a 5%
increase in positive self-reported health, smoking cessation would be associated with only
a 1.5% decrease in mortality rates. This estimated effect on mortality rates is also smaller
than previous findings, which generally report 10 to 30% decreases in mortality rates (Doll
and Peto, 1976; Hammond, 1966; Kahn, 1966; Carstensen et al., 1987).
As mentioned above, Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Balia and Jones (2008) are the
first two papers which estimate a causal relationship between smoking (and other behavior)
and health by applying a recursive multivariate probit model. Both papers argue that
smoking increases mortality rates by 22% and generates 15% more poor self-reported health
outcomes. Although these papers focused on the effects of smoking on health outcomes,
not smoking cessation, the estimated treatment effects in this paper are smaller than those
reported in Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Balia and Jones (2008).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1990) reported hypothetical disease
incidence rates for current, former and never smokers, shown in Figure 3.2. Across all age
groups, current smokers have higher disease incidence rates than never smokers. This figure
shows three different hypothetical outcomes for a former smoker after quitting: smoking
cessation does not change disease incidence rates (Curve A), smoking cessation reduces
disease incidence rates but the rates stay between current smokers and never smokers (Curve
B), and the rates decline quickly and converge to the rates for never smokers (Curve C).
From previous empirical findings, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1990)
concluded that the decline in the risk of death for a former smoker begins after quitting,
continues for 10 to 15 years, and finally the risk drops to equal those who never smoked
(Curve C in Figure 3.2). However, given previous findings and their empirical limitations,
5Benjamins et al. (2004) used a US sample while this paper uses a British sample. Also there are
differences in health status measures: Benjamins et al. (2004)’s question asks whether an individual’s health
is excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor.
6The dependent variable is equal to one when an individual reports his/her health as excellent or good,
and zero otherwise. Changing from very poor to excellent should be a rare outcome, so I only focus on
changes from fair to good.
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the smaller estimated effects of smoking cessation in this paper would indicate that the risk
of former smokers declines but would not converge to the risk of never smokers (Curve B
in Figure 3.2). Even if convergence effects exist, the rate of convergence would be slower
than previous findings suggest. Also, reverse causality would generate overestimated effects
of smoking cessation, since former smokers tend to quit smoking when they have a health
problem, and estimated effects capture changes in health from coincident poor health status.
This paper analyzed 10 BHPS waves due to data limitations in other waves of the survey.
Access to only 10 years of observations on smoking behavior might prevent the estimation
of long-term effects of smoking cessation since I can only track former smokers for 5 to 8
years after quitting. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1990) argues that
the impact of cessation lasts for 10 to 15 years. Also, as the BHPS does not contain more
detailed question on physical activity and drinking, I cannot control for the case where
a former smoker engages in more healthy behaviors than quitting smoking. Questions on
physical activity and drinking ask whether an individual does exercise (drinks) once a week,
once in a month, several times in a yea,r and once in a year. This is not enough variation to
determine whether former smokers changed his/her entire life style after quitting.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of smoking cessation on health outcomes. A relatively
large longitudinal data set from the British Household Panel Survey allows for a detailed
analysis of the effects of smoking cessation. To address self-selection problems, the paper
employs propensity score matching. Defining quitting smoking as the treatment group and
inconsistent smokers as the control group, this paper finds a 8% increase in the probability
of better self-reported health after quitting smoking. This estimated effect diminishes with
the number of cigarettes smoked before quitting and smoking tenure.
While this paper is first to explore the causal relationship between smoking cessation
and health by addressing self-selection bias and reverse causation problems, other empirical
problems such as false reporting on smoking behavior, and other healthy behaviors that
former smokers tend to take up after quitting still exist due to the data limitations. Ad-
Hyunwoong Pyun Chapter 3. Smoking Cessation and Health 59
ditional future research on this topic is clearly needed, using better data sets if any exist.
Tracking longer periods of smoking cessation is also important to determine the long-term
causal effects of smoking cessation.
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(a) Whole inconsistent smokers as a control group
(b) Failure group as a control group
Figure 3.1: Changes in Health Outcomes
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Figure 3.2: Hypothetical Disease Incidence Rates for Current, Former and Never Smokers,
by Age
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics - Smoking behavior 1999-2008
Frequency %
All time smoker 967 12.13
All time non-smoker 2487 31.19
Inconsistent smoker 1031 12.93
Quitter 452 5.67
Other 3036 38.07
Total 7973 100.00
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics - Matching Covariates in 2000
Quitters Whole inconsistent smokers Failure group
Before matching After matching
Annual income 12851 12230 13075 13327
Age 41.81 39.59** 42.03 39.63**
Female 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.51
Marital status 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.50
# of child 0.54 0.69** 0.58 0.64
Further education 0.41 0.35 0.42 0.39
Self-employed 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09
Retired 0.14 0.10** 0.12 0.09**
sc1 0.38 0.31*** 0.34 0.32*
sc2 0.43 0.46 0.34 0.48
sc3 0.21 0.26** 0.25 0.22
drink 0.36 0.40 0.34 0.42*
exercise 0.54 0.48** 0.52 0.46**
# of cigarettes 7.06 9.68*** 10.71*** 8.24*
smoking tenure 27.08 26.02 26.59 24.47**
London 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06
Scotland 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.24**
Wales 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.21*
North east 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04
North west 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.08
Yorks 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
East Midland 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
West Midland 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
East England 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05*
South east 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11
South west 0.07 0.05* 0.07 0.04*
* indicates p-value from t-test for testing difference from quitter group.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, respectively
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Table 3.3: Difference-in-Differences Results
DV Self-reported health
Control group Whole inconsistent smokers Failure group
treated group 0.023 -0.010
(0.026) (0.026)
quit 0.275*** 0.267***
(0.039) (0.039)
quit*# of cigarettes smoked -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
quit*smoking tenure -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, respectively
Cluster-corrected standard errors at individual level in parentheses.
Year-fixed effects are included.
Table 3.4: Robustness Check
Falsification tests
DV Breathing problem Skin allergies Digestive problem Epilepsy
Control group WIS Failure WIS Failure WIS Failure WIS Failure
quit -0.197*** -0.188*** 0.012 0.014 -0.039 -0.039 0.017 0.018
(0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.035) (0.025) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012)
quit*# of cigarettes smoked 0.004** 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.003** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
quit*smoking tenure 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, respectively
Cluster-corrected standard errors at individual level in parentheses.
Year-fixed effects are included.
WIS indicates the whole inconsistent smokers group
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